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Abstract
We consider a Hotelling game where a finite number of retailers choose
a location, given that their potential customers are distributed on a network.
Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer
shops at the closest store. We show that when the number of retailers is large
enough, the game admits a pure Nash equilibrium and we construct it. We
then compare the equilibrium cost bore by the consumers with the cost that
could be achieved if the retailers followed the dictate of a benevolent planner.
We perform this comparison in term of the induced price of anarchy, i.e., the
ratio of the worst equilibrium cost and the optimal cost, and the induced price
of stability, i.e., the ratio of the best equilibrium cost and the optimal cost. We
show that, asymptotically in the number of retailers, these ratios are two and
one, respectively.
JEL Classification: C72, R30, R39.
Keywords : Induced price of anarchy, induced price of stability, location games on
networks, pure equilibria, large games.
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1 Introduction
In his famous seminal paper Hotelling (1929) considers duopoly models with dif-
ferentiated products. The article is extremely rich in modeling, motivation, and
examples in different areas. Among the different models in the paper, the one that
came to be known as the Hotelling’s model, involves two retailers along a road (a
segment), who can decide where to locate their shops. Consumers are assumed to be
uniformly distributed along the road and their preference is to patronize the nearest
shop. Although it would be socially optimal that the two retailers set up their shops
respectively at 1/4 and 3/4 of the distance from one end of the road, this behavior
would not give rise to an equilibrium and would induce profitable deviations for each
of the players. In equilibrium both retailers set shop in the middle of the road, giving
rise to a suboptimal situation for the consumers, who now, on average, have to travel
twice as much as in the social optimum to reach their preferred store. Although not
expressed in the language of game theory (the paper by von Neumann (1928) had just
appeared and John Nash was one year old), the paper contains an insightful analysis
of the tension between social optimum and strategic behavior of agents. Hotelling
emphasizes how differentiation of products can refer to features different from geo-
graphical distance and mentions even some applications in political science, where
the product becomes the program that candidates propose to their voters. He shows
how the principle of minimum differentiation applies in different contexts.
Hotelling’s model has been generalized and modified in many directions, as will
be described below. In most of the existing literature the set of possible actions for
the retailers is very simple, e.g, a segment or a circle. In this paper we consider a
model where consumers are uniformly distributed on a network. A finite number of
retailers can set shop anywhere they want on this network. They all sell the same
product and their decision variable is only the location. This model applies for in-
stance to shops that sell products whose price is exogenously determined, for instance
newsstands, pharmacies, franchises of different types of services and products, e.g.,
mobile telephones, brand clothes, etc.
Consumers are assumed to be homogeneous in the sense that they buy the same
quantity of goods and, given the uniformity of prices, they shop at the closest store.
We assume that the cost for a consumer is proportional to the distance she has to
travel to do her shopping. The network where consumers are distributed is very
general: connectedness is not assumed, only finite length. We model the situation as
a game where the payers are the retailers, their actions are the location they choose
on the network, and their payoff is the amount of consumers they can convince to
shop at their store. We concentrate our attention on the existence of pure equilibria.
We compare the outcome of an equilibrium of the game to the situation where
a planner makes optimal decisions for everybody. Similar comparisons are usually
performed through the price of anarchy, i.e., the ratio between the total socially
optimal payoff and the total payoff induced by the worst equilibrium. A different
3
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comparison is obtained by considering the price of stability, that is, ratio between the
total socially optimal payoff and the total payoff induced by the best equilibrium.
Since the retailers split the total mass of consumers among themselves, the game
is fixed-sum, so the price of anarchy is not at all informative. Nevertheless, something
interesting can be obtained if, instead of taking the retailers’ viewpoint, we examine
the situation from the consumers’ point of view. It is clear that the retailers’ behavior
affects the cost incurred by the consumers, that is, the distance they have to travel to
reach the closest shop. Hence we consider the ratio between the worst total consumer
cost that an equilibrium can induce and the optimal total cost that a benevolent
planner can achieve. We call this new measure of efficiency induced price of anarchy,
to emphasize the fact that it does not concern the players of the games, but rather
the passive subjects (customers). In an analogous way, we define the induced price of
stability, that is, the ratio between the best total consumer cost that an equilibrium
can induce and the optimal total cost that a benevolent planner can achieve.
The main results of the paper concern existence of equilibria and the asymptotic
value of the induced prices of anarchy and stability. In particular we show that,
whatever the network, a pure Nash equilibrium of the game exists when the number
of players is large enough, and we construct such an equilibrium. For specific networks,
more precise results hold. For instance, when the network is a star, we show that
when the number of players lies in a specific interval, then the game does not admit
pure equilibria. For any number of players outside this interval, equilibria exist and
we can say when they are unique.
Moreover we show that the induced price of anarchy is asymptotically 2, no matter
what the network is. Therefore, when the number of players is large, the induced price
of anarchy becomes close to the one obtained when consumers are distributed on a
circle. We also show that the induced price of stability is asymptotically 1, that is,
that efficiency can approximately be achieved in equilibrium, when the number of
retailers is large. This shows that, when the number of players is large, the best role
that a planner can play in achieving efficiency is to propose a good equilibrium to
the players, given that the game is zero-sum, so retailers have no reason to prefer one
equilibrium over another.
The results on the induced price of anarchy and on the induced price of stability are
proved using majorization techniques (see, e.g. Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold, 2011).
Review of the literature
Several generalizations and variations of Hotelling’s model have been considered
in the literature. Here we cite only a small fraction of the contributions to the topic.
Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) contains a nice survey of the literature up to
1992. For a more recent survey the reader is referred to Brenner (2010).
Shortly after Hotelling (1929), both Chamberlin (1933) and Lerner and Singer
(1937) criticize Hotelling’s results and consider models with more than two firms.
4
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.33
Eaton and Lipsey (1975) describe a Hotelling-type model with an arbitrary number
of players, different possible structures of the space where retailers can locate, and
different distributions of the customers. They show how the principle of minimum
differentiation holds only under strong hypotheses. d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and
Thisse (1979) show that in a model where duopolists compete on price the principle
of minimum differentiation does not hold. de Palma, Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou, and
Thisse (1985) show that Hotelling’s principle of minimum differentiation holds when
products and consumers are heterogeneous.
Osborne and Pitchik (1986) study mixed equilibria of the Hotelling game and
Osborne and Pitchik (1987) consider a two-stage model where firms choose location
in the first stage and price in the second. Economides (1993) studies a model with
more than two firms, proves the existence of an equilibrium in prices, and shows that
no subgame perfect equilibrium exists in a two stage model where location is chosen in
the first stage and price in the second. Bester, de Palma, Leininger, Thomas, and von
Thadden (1996) consider a two-firm two-stage model with quadratic transportation
costs and prove that infinite mixed equilibria exist.
Salop (1979) considers a model with two different industries where the technical
corner difficulties of Hotelling’s model are eliminated by assuming that the consumers
are distributed on a circle. Lederer and Hurter (1986) consider a model where firms
are different and consumers are non uniformly distributed on the plane. Aoyagi and
Okabe (1993) look at a bidimensional market and, with the help of simulation, relate
the existence of equilibria and their properties to the shape of the market. Eiselt and
Laporte (1993) model the case of three firms on a tree. Anderson, Goeree, and Ramer
(1997) study a model with two firms and nonuniform distribution of consumers. They
find conditions on this distribution for existence of equilibria. Irmen and Thisse (1998)
develop a duopoly model where differentiation can happen across several dimensions.
Mavronicolas, Monien, Papadopoulou, and Schoppmann (2008) and Feldmann,
Mavronicolas, and Monien (2009) consider a Hotelling model on graphs where firms
can locate only on the vertices of the graph. Soetevent (2010) extends Hotelling’s
model of price competition with quadratic transportation costs from a line to graphs.
Pa´lvo¨lgyi (2011) considers Hotelling games on graphs. His approach is quite close to
the one used in this paper, but, unfortunately, his results are not accurate.
The price of anarchy was introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999)
and the name was coined by Papadimitriou (2001). Several authors have studied
this topic in different contexts: routing games (see, e.g., Roughgarden and Tardos,
2002, 2004, Correa, Schulz, and Stier-Moses, 2004, 2007, 2008), cost sharing (see,
e.g., Moulin, 2008, Epstein, Feldman, and Mansour, 2009, Hoefer, 2011), auctions
(see, e.g., Moulin, 2010), coalition formation (see, e.g., Immorlica, Markakis, and Pil-
iouras, 2013), health care (see, e.g., Knight and Harper, 2013), games with incomplete
information (see, e.g., Roughgarden, 2012), etc. The price of stability was introduced
by Schulz and Stier Moses (2003). We are not aware of any previous use of the induced
price of anarchy or the induced price of stability.
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Organization of the paper
In Section 2 the model is introduced. Section 3 provides some general results.
Several examples are considered in Section 4. All the proofs can be found in the
Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 The network
A planar curve (or simply a curve) is a continuous mapping φ : [0, 1] → R2. Its
length λ(φ) is defined as
λ(φ) := sup
m∈N
{
m∑
i=1
‖φ(ti)− φ(ti−1)‖ : 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tm = 1
}
A curve is called simple if it is injective and rectifiable if it has finite length.
Consider a planar graph (V,E), where V ⊂ R2 is a finite set of vertices and E
is a finite set of edges. We define the network S to be the planar embedding of the
graph and we identify each edge e ∈ E with the corresponding rectifiable curve of the
planar embedding, which, with an abuse of language, we still call e. If e connects the
vertices u, v, then we sometime use the notation [u, v] for e and (u, v) for [u, v]\{u, v}.
Given two points x, y ∈ S we define their distance d(x, y) as the length of the
shortest path in S that connects them. The distance d(x, y) is infinite if S is not
connected and x and y belong to different connected components of the network.
The network S is then a Borel set, endowed with the measure generated by the
length. We will use the same symbol λ for this measure. We define
L := λ(S) =
∑
e∈E
λ(e).
We call leaf a vertex v ∈ V such that degree(v) = 1. The network S generated
by a graph (V,E) is equivalent to a network generated by a sub-graph whose vertices
have degree different from 2. This subgraph can be obtained by performing this simple
operation: whenever the vertex u has degree two, delete it and replace [v, u] and [u, w]
with [v, w] so that λ([v, w]) = λ([v, u]) + λ([u, w]). Therefore we will always assume
that V contains no vertices of degree 2. We extend the definition of the function
degree from V to S by assuming that degree(x) = 2 for all x ∈ S \ V .
2.2 The game
We consider a situation where each of n retailers has to decide where to locate
her shop on a network, given that an uncountable population of consumers is uni-
formly distributed on the network and each consumer patronizes a shop in the closest
6
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location, where ties will be solved as follows. Consider the set A of consumers that
are equally distant from k different locations having each at least one shop. Then
we assume that for each of these k locations, λ(A)/k consumers go to that location.
Moreover if one of the k locations has h shops, then a fraction λ(A)/hk patronizes
each shop of this location.
Basically the network is decomposed into domains of attraction of different re-
tailers’s locations and then within each domain of attraction retailers in the same
location split the consumers equally. Some parts of the network can belong to differ-
ent domains of attraction, as the following example shows.
Example 2.1. Consider the network in Figure 1 with seven players. Assume that
λ(e4) = λ(e5) and that two retailers are located in u and five retailers are located in
v. All the points in e8 are equally distant from u and v. Therefore the retailers in
u jointly attract all the consumers on the red edges plus half of the consumers on
e8. The retailers in v jointly attract all the consumers on the green edges plus the
remaining half of the consumers on e8. That is, each player in u attracts the following
quantity of consumers
1
2
(
λ(e1) + λ(e2) + λ(e3) + λ(e4) +
1
2
λ(e8)
)
and each player in v attracts the following quantity of consumers
1
5
(
λ(e5) + λ(e6) + λ(e7) +
1
2
λ(e8)
)
.
This example shows that the situation of a Hotelling game on a general network is
more complicated than the classical case of a game on a circle or a segment. The
fact that a set of positive measure may be equidistant from two points imposes some
extra care in the definition of the domain of attraction of retailers.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
We model this as a normal form game with a finite set Nn = {1, . . . , n} of players
having all the same action set S. When there is no risk of confusion we will just write
N instead of Nn. Each player represents a retailer, whose payoff is the measure of
the set of consumers who shop at her store. In order to formally define the players’
payoffs, we need to introduce the following quantities. Given x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S
n,
callX(x) the set of all y ∈ S for which there exists i ∈ Nn such that y = xi. In general
card(X(x)) ≤ n, since several players can chose the same location. For K ⊂ X(x)
define
YK = {y ∈ S : d(y, xi) = d(y, xj) for all xi, xj ∈ K
and d(y, xi) < d(y, xℓ) for all xi ∈ K, xℓ 6∈ K}.
(2.1)
7
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The payoff of player i ∈ Nn under the strategy profile x is
ρi(x) =
1
card({j ∈ Nn : xj = xi})
∑
K⊂Nn
1xi∈K
λ(YK)
card(K)
. (2.2)
The above defined game is called Hotelling game on S and is denoted by H (Nn, S,ρ),
where ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn). The set of all its Nash equilibria is denoted by E (H ).
Consider a game H (Nn, S,ρ). For x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S
n and y ∈ S define
d(x, y) := min
i∈{1,...,n}
(d(xi, y)).
If S is not connected, then it can happen that no xi is in the same component as y,
and therefore d(x, y) =∞.
The social cost σ(x) is defined as
σ(x) :=
∫
S
d(x, y) dy.
Again, if S is not connected, we can have σ(x) =∞.
Definition 2.2. Consider a game H (Nn, S,ρ) that admits a Nash equilibrium. We
define
1. the socially optimal cost
Opt(H (Nn, S,ρ)) := inf
x∈Sn
σ(x),
2. the worst equilibrium cost
WEq(H (Nn, S,ρ)) := inf
x∈E (H )
σ(x),
3. the best equilibrium cost
BEq(H (Nn, S,ρ)) := sup
x∈E (H )
σ(x),
4. the induced price of anarchy
IPoA(H (Nn, S,ρ)) :=
WEqH (Nn, S,ρ)
OptH (Nn, S,ρ)
,
5. the induced price of stability
IPoS(H (Nn, S,ρ)) :=
BEqH (Nn, S,ρ)
OptH (Nn, S,ρ)
.
Notice that OptH (Nn, S,ρ) > 0 since n is finite and λ(S) > 0, so there always
exists a positive mass of consumers at a strictly positive distance from the closest
possible retailer. Therefore both IPoA(H (Nn, S,ρ)) and IPoS(H (Nn, S,ρ)) are well
defined.
8
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3 General results
The results in this section are valid for any possible finite network, not necessarily
connected. The first theorem shows that Hotelling games always have pure Nash
equilibria, provided the number of players is large enough. To be more precise, for
every fixed network, there exists a threshold such that, for any number of players
above this threshold, the game admits a pure Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. For an arbitrary S, there exists n¯ ∈ N such that for every n ≥ n¯, the
game H (Nn, S,ρ) admits a Nash equilibrium.
A similar result was stated and proved by Pa´lvo¨lgyi (2011). Unfortunately his
statement and proof appear to be incorrect.
The next theorem provides a bound for the induced price of anarchy in a Hotelling
game. A by-product of this result is that asymptotically the induced price of anarchy
cannot exceed 2. As the following sections show, the result holds exactly and not only
asymptotically for simple configurations of the network. The same theorem provides
an asymptotic result on the price of stability.
Given a graph (V,E), define
VI = {v ∈ V : degree(v) ≥ 3}, (3.1)
VL = {v ∈ V : degree(v) = 1}, (3.2)
EL = {e ∈ E : e = (v, w), v ∈ VI , w ∈ VL}, (3.3)
ELL = {e ∈ E : e = (v, w), v, w ∈ VL}, (3.4)
EI = {e ∈ E : e = (v, v
′), v, w ∈ VI}. (3.5)
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that the game H (Nn, S,ρ) has an equilibrium. Then
(a)
IPoA(H (Nn, S,ρ)) ≤ 2 +
2 card(EI) + card(EL)
n
.
(b)
lim
n→∞
IPoS(H (Nn, S,ρ)) = 1.
The interpretation of Theorem 3.2 is that, when the number of retailers is large,
if they are left to their own devices and play a bad Nash equilibrium, the outcome of
their actions could decrease efficiency by a factor of two, approximately. On the other
hand, if a planner cajoles them to play a suitable Nash equilibrium, then efficiency is
almost achieved.
Given that the game is zero-sum and symmetric, the retailers have no clear pref-
erence of an equilibrium over another, on the other hand, in general, they have no
incentive to play a social optimum that is not an equilibrium. The role of the planner
is then to propose to the players a profile of strategy that is approximately efficient
and, moreover, is stable, i.e., is a Nash equilibrium.
9
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4 Examples
In this section we consider some simple examples of networks and show that in
these cases exact results can be obtained.
4.1 The circle
In this model consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit circle C. This
model has been studied by Eaton and Lipsey (1975) and Salop (1979).
Proposition 4.1. For every n ∈ N the set of equilibria of the game H (Nn, C,ρ) is
a non-empty polytope.
Proposition 4.2. We have
(a)
IPoA(H (Nn, C,ρ)) =
{
2 if n is even,
2
n
n+ 1
if n is odd.
(b) For positive n
IPoS(H (Nn, C,ρ)) = 1.
Figures 2, 3, 4 show examples of equilibria on the circle.
FIGURES 2, 3, 4 ABOUT HERE
4.2 The segment
The model described in this subsection was studied in details by Eaton and Lipsey
(1975) under slightly different assumptions. We consider a Hotelling game on a seg-
ment, which, without any loss of generality, is assumed to be [0, 1].
Proposition 4.3. Consider the Hotelling game H (Nn, [0, 1],ρ).
(a) For n = 2, 4, 5 there exists a unique (modulo permutation of players) pure Nash
equilibrium (see Figures 5, 6, 7).
(b) For n = 3, there is no pure Nash equilibrium.
(c) For n > 6, there is an infinite number of pure Nash equilibria. They form an
(n− 5)-dimensional convex polytope.
10
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FIGURES 5, 6, 7, 8 ABOUT HERE
If we call ηi = xi+4−xi+3 then Figure 8 is a example of n-player Nash equilibrium.
We now compute the induced price of anarchy and the induced price of stability
for Hotelling games on a segment.
Proposition 4.4. We have
(a)
IPoA(H (Nn, [0, 1],ρ)) =
{
2 if n is even,
2
n
n+ 1
if n > 3 is odd.
(b) For n = 2
IPoS(H (Nn, [0, 1],ρ)) = IPoA(H (Nn, [0, 1],ρ)) = 2.
For n ≥ 4
IPoS(H (Nn, [0, 1],ρ)) =
n
n− 2
.
Figures 9, 10, 11, 12 provide examples of social optima, and best and worst equi-
libria on the segment.
FIGURES 9, 10, 11, 12 ABOUT HERE
4.3 The star
In the whole section, we have k > 2. We consider the case where S is a star Sk,
that is a network with k+1 vertices {v0, v1, . . . , vk} where for j ∈ {1, . . . , k} vertex vj
is connected to vertex v0 and to no other vertex. In the whole section, we assume that
the length of the edges [v0, vj] is the same for all j. Without any loss of generality we
assume this length to be 1.
Proposition 4.5. Consider a Hotelling game H (Nn, Sk,ρ).
(a) If n ≤ k, then a unique equilibrium x∗ exists where x∗i = v0 for all i ∈ Nn.
(b) If k < n < 3k − 1, then there is no Nash equilibrium.
(c) If 3k − 1 ≤ n ≤ 3k, there exists a unique equilibrium.
(d) If 3k + 1 ≤ n then there exists an infinite number of equilibria.
Figures 13, 14, 15 show some examples of equilibria on the star with different
numbers of players.
FIGURES 13, 14, 15 ABOUT HERE
11
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A Proofs
Majorization
We introduce some well-known basic concepts in the theory of majorization that
will be used in the proof of some results. We refer the reader to Marshall et al. (2011)
for an extensive analysis of this topic.
Definition A.1. Given a vector z = (z1, . . . , zn), call z[1] ≥ · · · ≥ z[n] its decreasing
rearrangement. Let x,y ∈ Rn+ be such that
n∑
i=1
xi =
n∑
i=1
yi
and, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}
k∑
i=1
x[i] ≤
k∑
i=1
y[i].
Then we say that x is majorized by y (x ≺ y).
Definition A.2. A function φ : Rn+ → R is said to be Schur-convex if x ≺ y implies
φ(x) ≤ φ(y).
Lemma A.3. If ψ : R+ → R is a convex function and
φ(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
ψ(xi),
then φ is Schur-convex.
Proof of Section 3
Lemma A.4. Given S, define f : R+ → N as follows:
f(x) = 3 card(E) +
∑
e∈E
⌈
λ(e)
2x
⌉
. (A.1)
Then, for all n ≥ 4 card(E), there exist ξ, ξ¯ ∈ R+ such that
n ≤ f(ξ) ≤ n+ card(E), for all ξ ∈ [ξ, ξ¯).
Proof. The function f is defined as the sum of a constant and card(E) terms each
one of which is a piecewise constant, weakly decreasing, and right continuous function
with jumps of magnitude 1. Therefore, for all x0 > 0,
0 ≤ lim
x→x−0
f(x)− f(x0) ≤ card(E).
12
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Moreover, we have
lim
x→∞
f(x) = 3 card(E) + card(E) = 4 card(E),
lim
x→0+
f(x) = +∞.
Proposition A.5. For a given S there exists n¯ ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n¯ there
exists n′ ∈ N for which
(a) n ≤ n′ ≤ n+ card(E),
(b) the game H (Nn′ , S,ρ) admits a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let f be defined as in (A.1) and let
n¯ = f
(
mine∈E λ(e)
10
)
. (A.2)
Take n ≥ n¯. By Lemma A.4 there exists an interval [ξ, ξ¯) such that, for ξ ∈ [ξ, ξ¯) we
have f(ξ) = n′, with n ≤ n′ ≤ n+ card(E).
We choose ξ = ξ and construct a Nash equilibrium x∗ of H (Nn′ , S,ρ). To do so,
we position players on the edges of S as follows.
First case: e ∈ EL. If e = (v, w), with w ∈ VL, then, under x
∗, the number of players
on e is
degree(v) +
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
+ 2.
Out of these players, degree(v) will be in v, and the remaining will be as in Figure 16.
Taking into account the number of players on e, the length λ(e), and the number of
intervals of length α(e)ξ, we have
α(e) =
λ(e)− 7ξ
ξ
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 3ξ
. (A.3)
FIGURE 16 ABOUT HERE
Second case: e ∈ EI . If e = (v, w), with v, w ∈ VI , then, under x
∗, the number of
players on e is
degree(v) + degree(w) +
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
+ 1.
13
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Out of these players, degree(v) will be in v, degree(w) will be in w, and the remaining
will be as in Figure 17. This implies that
α(e) =
λ(e)− 6ξ
ξ
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 2ξ
. (A.4)
Notice that in this case the construction is still valid if we reverse the roles of v and
w.
FIGURE 17 ABOUT HERE
Third case: e ∈ ELL. If e = (v, w), with v, w ∈ VL, then, under x
∗, the number of
players on e is ⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
+ 3.
They will be located as in Figure 18. This implies that
α(e) =
λ(e)− 8ξ
ξ
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 4ξ
. (A.5)
As before, in this case the construction remains valid if we reverse the roles of v and
w.
FIGURE 18 ABOUT HERE
The total number of players on S can be easily computed as follows. Given that
each vertex v ∈ V \VL has degree(v) players, there is a total of 2 card(EI)+card(EL)
players on the vertices. Moreover, for each e ∈ EI there are ⌈λ(e)/2ξ⌉+ 1 players in
the interior of e; for each e ∈ EL there are ⌈λ(e)/2ξ⌉ + 2 players in the interior of e;
for each e ∈ ELL there are ⌈λ(e)/2ξ⌉+ 3 players in the interior of e. Hence the total
number of players is
2 card(EI) + card(EL) + card(EI) + 2 card(EL) + 3 card(ELL) +
∑
e∈E
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
= 3 card(E) +
∑
e∈E
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
= f(ξ) = n′.
To prove that what we have constructed is a Nash equilibrium, we need to show
that for all e ∈ E, we have
1 ≤ α(e) ≤ 2. (A.6)
14
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Under x∗, if inequality (A.6) is satisfied, the payoff of each player is between ξ and
2ξ. Moreover, if a player deviated on an interval between two other players, then she
would obtain a payoff equal to half the length of that interval. If inequality (A.6) is
satisfied, then no interval between players is longer than 2ξ.
Furthermore, in this construction, all players who share a location with some other
player have a payoff equal to ξ. This implies that if a player deviates to a location
that already has more than one player, then her payoff becomes less than ξ. Therefore
no player has a profitable deviation.
Claim A.6. For all e ∈ EL, (A.6) holds.
Proof. Given (A.3), it is clear that α(e) ≤ 2 if and only if
2
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 6−
λ(e)
ξ
+ 7 ≥ 0.
The above inequality holds since
2
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
−
λ(e)
ξ
+ 1 ≥ 2
λ(e)
2ξ
−
λ(e)
ξ
+ 1 = 1 ≥ 0.
On the other hand α(e) ≥ 1 if and only if
λ(e)
ξ
− 7−
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
+ 3 ≥ 0.
To show that the inequality holds consider that
λ(e)
ξ
−
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 4 ≥
λ(e)
ξ
−
λ(e)
2ξ
− 5 =
λ(e)
2ξ
− 5.
Since, by (A.2),
f(ξ) = n′ ≥ n¯ = f
(
mine′∈E λ(e
′)
10
)
and f is weakly decreasing, we have
ξ ≤
mine′∈E λ(e
′)
10
≤
λ(e)
10
.
Therefore
λ(e)
2ξ
− 5 ≥ 0.
Claim A.7. For all e ∈ EI , (A.6) holds.
15
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Proof. Given (A.4), it is clear that α(e) ≤ 2 if and only if
2
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 4−
λ(e)
ξ
+ 6 ≥ 0.
The above inequality holds since
2
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
−
λ(e)
ξ
+ 2 ≥ 2
λ(e)
2ξ
−
λ(e)
ξ
+ 2 = 2 ≥ 0.
On the other hand α(e) ≥ 1 if and only if
λ(e)
ξ
− 6−
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
+ 2 ≥ 0.
To show that the inequality holds consider that
λ(e)
ξ
−
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 4 ≥
λ(e)
ξ
−
λ(e)
2ξ
− 5 =
λ(e)
2ξ
− 5.
As mentioned in the proof of Claim A.7, expression (A.2) implies
λ(e)
2ξ
− 5 ≥ 0.
Claim A.8. For all e ∈ ELL, (A.6) holds.
Proof. Given (A.5), it is clear that α(e) ≤ 2 if and only if
2
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 8−
λ(e)
ξ
+ 8 ≥ 0.
The above inequality holds since
2
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
−
λ(e)
ξ
≥ 2
λ(e)
2ξ
−
λ(e)
ξ
= 0.
On the other hand α(e) ≥ 1 if and only if
λ(e)
ξ
− 8−
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
+ 4 ≥ 0.
To show that the inequality holds consider that
λ(e)
ξ
−
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 4 ≥
λ(e)
ξ
−
λ(e)
2ξ
− 5 =
λ(e)
2ξ
− 5.
But, again, (A.2) implies
λ(e)
2ξ
− 5 ≥ 0.
16
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. Proposition A.5 shows that for every
n ≥ 3 card(E) +
∑
e∈E
⌈
5λ(e)
mine′∈E λ(e′)
⌉
(A.7)
there exists an integer n ≤ n′ ≤ n+card(E) such that the game H (Nn′ , S,ρ) admits
a Nash equilibrium. Given such an equilibrium, we will construct an equilibrium for a
new game with n′−k players where 0 ≤ k ≤ card(E). This can be achieved as follows.
We start with the equilibrium of Proposition A.5. For edges e = (v, w) ∈ EL we can
remove one of the two players whose distance from v is 2ξ. For edges e = (v, w) ∈ EI
we can remove one of the two players whose distance from w is 2ξ. Finally for edges
e = (v, w) ∈ ELL we can remove one of the two players whose distance from w is
3ξ. This way we can remove any number k of players with 0 ≤ k ≤ card(E). We
show now that this removal produces a profile that remains an equilibrium in the new
game with less players. In fact this removal does not change the size of any interval,
it changes the payoff of only k players, who now gain 2ξ rather than ξ, therefore, it
does not produce any opportunity of profitable deviation for any other player, given
that every player gains at least ξ.
This proves that, for every n that satisfies (A.7), the game H (Nn, S,ρ) has an
equilibrium.
Definition A.9. A strategy profile x satisfies the vertex property if, for all v ∈ VI ,
there exists i ∈ Nn such that xi = v.
Definition A.10. Let x satisfy the vertex property. Then, for a, b ∈ S, we call [a, b]
an x-half-interval if either
(i) there exist e ∈ E and i ∈ Nn such that b ∈ e is a leaf, xi = a ∈ e, and for no
j ∈ N we have xj ∈ (a, b], or
(ii) there exist e ∈ E, i, ℓ ∈ N such that xi = a ∈ e, xℓ ∈ e, for no j ∈ N we have
xj between a and xℓ, and d([a, b]) = d([b, xℓ]) = d([a, xℓ])/2, i.e., b is the middle
point between a and xℓ.
In both cases the roles of a and b can be interchanged.
In profile x, if m players share the same location, then we use the convention that
there are 2(m−1) zero-length x-half intervals between them. If profile x satisfies the
vertex property then the whole graph can be covered with x-half intervals. We call
H(x) the class of all x-half intervals in S.
Lemma A.11. Given a strategy profile x, there exists i ∈ N such that ρi(x) ≤ L/n.
Proof. If ρi(x) > L/n for all i ∈ Nn, then
∑n
i=1 ρi(x) > L, which is a contradiction,
since
∑n
i=1 ρi(x) = L.
17
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Lemma A.12. If x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of H (Nn, S,ρ), then for all y ∈ S we
have d(y,x∗) ≤ 2L/n.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction that there exists y0 ∈ S is such that d(y0,x
∗) >
2L/n. By Lemma A.11 there exists a player whose payoff is less or equal L/n. This
player could deviate to y0 and then attract at least half the consumers between y0
and the closest player, namely she could get a payoff larger than L/n, making the
deviation profitable.
Lemma A.13. Let n > n¯, with n¯ defined as in (A.2). Assume that x∗ is a Nash
equilibrium of H (Nn, S,ρ). Then x
∗ satisfies the vertex property.
Proof. We have
n¯ = f
(
mine′∈E λ(e
′)
10
)
= 3 card(E) +
∑
e∈E
⌈
5λ(e)
mine′∈E λ(e′)
⌉
> 3 card(E) +
∑
e∈E
5λ(e)
mine′∈E λ(e′)
= 3 card(E) +
5L
mine′∈E λ(e′)
>
4L
mine′∈E λ(e′)
.
If n > n¯, then for any edge e ∈ E we have λ(e) ≥ 4L/n and, therefore, by
Lemma A.11, there are at least two players on e.
Take v0 ∈ VI and assume, ad absurdum, that no player is in v0. Let i the the
player whose location x∗i is the closest to v0 (i is not necessarily unique). If player i
moves towards v0 by ε < d(x
∗
i , v0), then she loses ε/2 on the edge where she resides,
but she wins (degree(v0)− 1)ε/2 on the other incident edges to v0. Therefore moving
towards v0 is a profitable deviation, which contradicts the assumption that x
∗ is an
equilibrium.
Lemma A.14. Let x satisfy the vertex property. Then the number of x-half intervals
in S is 2n+ 2 card(E)− card(VI)− card(V ).
Proof. Placing one player on each v ∈ VI creates card(E) intervals between two
vertices. Every time a new player is placed on some edge, a new interval is created (by
splitting an existing interval into two). This is true also if the new player is placed in
the same location of an existing player, since this creates two zero-length half intervals.
Therefore, once all n players are placed on S, there are exactly card(E)+n−card(VI)
intervals. Each on them contains two x-half intervals, except the ones between a
player and a leaf, which contain one half interval. Therefore the number of x-half
intervals is 2 card(E) + 2n− card(VI)− card(V ).
18
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Lemma A.15. Assume that x∗ is an equilibrium of H (Nn, S,ρ) and [a, b] is an
x∗-half interval. Then λ([a, b]) ≤ L/n.
Proof. Assume, ad absurdum, that λ([a, b]) > L/n. By Lemma A.11, there exists
i ∈ N such that ρi(x
∗) ≤ L/n. Two cases are possible.
Case (i) of Definition A.10. If player i deviates to [a, b] at a distance ε from a, then,
for ε small enough, her payoff becomes λ([a, b])− ε > L/n.
Case (ii) of Definition A.10. If player i deviates to b, then her payoff becomes
λ([a, b]) > L/n.
The existence of profitable deviations contradicts the assumption that x∗ is a
Nash equilibrium.
Lemma A.16. Assume that the conditions of Lemma A.13 are satisfied. Then
σ(x∗) ≤ L2/2n.
Proof. By Lemma A.13, x∗ satisfies the vertex property. From the definition of social
cost σ it follows that
σ(x∗) =
∑
[a,b]∈H(x∗)
(λ([a, b]))2
2
.
Call λ(x∗) the vector of all λ([a, b]) such that [a, b] ∈ H(x∗). By Lemma A.15, λ(x∗)
is dominated in the majorization order by the vector
(
L/n . . . L/n 0 . . . 0
)
,
where the number of positive components is n. Since the function (z1, . . . , zm) 7→∑m
i=1 z
2
1/2 is Schur-convex, we have
σ(x∗) ≤
n∑
i=1
1
2
(
L
n
)2
=
L2
2n
.
Lemma A.17. We have
Opt(H (Nn, S,ρ)) ≥
L2
2(2n+ 2 card(EI) + card(EL))
.
Proof. Call N˜n = Nn∪VI a fictitious set of players obtained by adding to the original
set of players Nn one player for each vertex of degree larger than 3. It is clear that
Opt(H (Nn, S,ρ)) ≥ Opt(H˜ (N˜n, S,ρ)),
where in the game H˜ (N˜n, S,ρ) each player in VI has only one available strategy, that
is, to choose the location corresponding to her own identity.
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Call x˜ the optimal profile of H˜ (N˜n, S,ρ). Applying the argument used in Lemma A.14
to this new game, we can show that the number of x˜-half intervals is
M :=2n+ 2 card(E)− card(V ) + card(VI)
=2n+ 2 card(E)− card(VL)
=2n+ 2 card(E)− card(EL)− 2 card(ELL)
=2n+ 2 card(EI) + card(EL).
It is clear that λ(x˜) dominates the vector
(
L/M . . . L/M
)
. Since
M∑
i=1
1
2
(
L
M
)2
=
L2
2M
,
we have
Opt(H (Nn, S,ρ)) ≥ Opt(H˜ (N˜n, S,ρ)) ≥
L2
2M
.
Proof of Theorem 3.2(a). The results follows from the bounds in Lemma A.16 and in
Lemma A.17.
Claim A.18. Consider the equilibrium x∗ constructed in the proof of Proposition A.5.
Then
σ(x∗) =
∑
e∈EL
(
7
ξ2
2
+
(⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 3
)
α(e)2ξ2
4
)
+
∑
e∈EI
(
6
ξ2
2
+
(⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 2
)
α(e)2ξ2
4
)
+
∑
e∈ELL
(
8
ξ2
2
+
(⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 4
)
α(e)2ξ2
4
)
.
Proof. Each edge e ∈ EL contains 7 half intervals of length ξ and
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 3 intervals
of length α(e)ξ. The cost of edge e is then
7
ξ2
2
+
(⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 3
)
α(e)2ξ2
4
.
Each edge e ∈ EI contains 6 half intervals of length ξ and
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 2 intervals of
length α(e)ξ. The cost of edge e is then
6
ξ2
2
+
(⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 2
)
α(e)2ξ2
4
.
Each edge e ∈ ELL contains 8 half intervals of length ξ and
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 4 intervals of
length α(e)ξ. The cost of edge e is then
8
ξ2
2
+
(⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 4
)
α(e)2ξ2
4
.
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Claim A.19.
L
2n− 4 card(E)
≤ ξ ≤
L
2n− 6 card(E)
.
Proof. By definition, ξ is such that f(ξ) = n′ with n ≤ n′ ≤ n+ card(E), where f is
defined as in (A.1). Therefore
n ≤ 3 card(E) +
∑
e∈E
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
≤ n+ card(E),
which implies
L
2n− 4 card(E)
≤ ξ ≤
L
2n− 6 card(E)
.
Claim A.20. For all e ∈ E we have limn→∞ α(e) = 2.
Proof. Claim A.19 implies
ξ ∼n→∞
L
2n
. (A.8)
Therefore, if e ∈ EL, then
α(e) =
λ(e)− 7ξ
ξ
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 3ξ
∼n→∞ 2;
if e ∈ EL, then
α(e) =
λ(e)− 6ξ
ξ
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 2ξ
∼n→∞ 2;
if e ∈ ELL, then
α(e) =
λ(e)− 8ξ
ξ
⌈
λ(e)
2ξ
⌉
− 4ξ
∼n→∞ 2.
Claim A.21.
σ(x∗) ∼n→∞
L2
4n
.
Proof. Using Claims A.18 and A.20, we have
σ(x∗) ∼ξ→0
∑
e∈EL
(
ξ2
2
+
λ(e)ξ
2
)
+
∑
e∈EI
(
ξ2 +
λ(e)ξ
2
)
+
∑
e∈ELL
(
2ξ2 +
λ(e)ξ
2
)
.
Hence
σ(x∗) ∼ξ→0
∑
e∈E
λ(e)ξ
2
,
that is, thanks to (A.8),
σ(x∗) ∼n→∞
L2
2n
.
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Proof of Theorem 3.2(b). By Lemma A.17 we have
Opt(H (Nn, S,ρ)) ≥
L2
4n+ 4 card(EI) + 2 card(EL)
.
Therefore
IPoS(H (Nn, S,ρ)) ≤
σ(x∗)
L2
4n+ 4 card(EI) + 2 card(EL)
.
Since
L2
4n+ 4 card(EI) + 2 card(EL))
∼n→∞
L2
4n
and IPoS(H (Nn, S,ρ)) ≥ 1, using Claim A.21, we obtain
lim
n→∞
IPoS(H (Nn, S,ρ)) = 1.
Proofs of Subsection 4.1
The set action for the players is now a circle C with radius r. Without loss of
generality we can suppose that r = 1. We fix an origin 0 and identify the circle C
with R/2π. We will always consider the representation of the points in [0, 2π).
Given a strategy profile x ∈ Cn, for each player i ∈ Nn, we define two domains
←
p i(x) and
→
p i(x) as follows. If we order the players i1 ≺ · · · ≺ in in terms of their
actions 0 ≤ xi1 ≤ · · · ≤ xin < 2π (solve the ties arbitrarily). Make the relation ≺
cyclic by assuming in ≺ i1. For ℓ ∈ Nn define
←
p iℓ(x) =
1
2
d(xiℓ−1 , xiℓ),
→
p iℓ(x) =
1
2
d(xiℓ , xiℓ+1),
where i0 := in and in+1 := i1.
Claim A.22. For i ∈ Nn
ρi(x) =
1
card{ℓ : xℓ = xi}
∑
ℓ:xℓ=xi
(
←
p ℓ(x) +
→
p ℓ(x)
)
.
Proof. This is immediate from the definition of ρ,
→
p ℓ(x) and
←
p ℓ(x).
The proof of Proposition 4.1 is based on the following lemma.
Lemma A.23. If the profile x∗ is an equilibrium of the Hotelling game H (Nn, C,ρ)
then the following conditions are satisfied:
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(a) For every y ∈ [0, 1]
card{i : x∗i = y} ≤ 2.
(b) There exist ξ > 0 such that for all y ∈ C, if
card{i : x∗i = y} = 2,
then
←
p i(x
∗) = 0 and
→
p i(x
∗) = ξ
or
→
p i(x
∗) = 0 and
←
p i(x
∗) = ξ.
(c) For every i ∈ Nn,
max
ij∈Nn
d(x∗ij , x
∗
ij+1
) ≤ 2
(
→
p i(x
∗) +
←
p i(x
∗)
)
. (A.9)
Proof. (a) Suppose, ad absurdum, that there exist a value y ∈ [0, 1] such that {i ∈
Nn : x
∗
i = y} = {i1, . . . , iℓ} with ℓ > 2. Then for some α, β > 0
←
p i1(x
∗) = α,
→
p i1(x
∗) = 0
for all j ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ− 1},
←
p ij(x
∗) =
→
p ij(x
∗) = 0,
←
p iℓ(x
∗) = 0,
→
p iℓ(x
∗) = β.
This implies
ℓ∑
i=1
ρi(x
∗) = α + β,
therefore
ρj(x
∗) =
α + β
ℓ
<
α + β
2
< max(α, β) for all j ∈ {1, ℓ}.
For ε small enough any player j ∈ {i1, ...iℓ} would get α− ε by playing y− ε or β− ε
by playing y + ε, so this would be a profitable deviation.
(b) Let y ∈ [0, 1] be such that x∗i1 = x
∗
i2
= y and card{i : xi = y} = 2. Then for some
α, β > 0
→
p i1(x
∗) =
←
p i2(x
∗) = 0
←
p i1(x
∗) = α
→
p i2(x
∗) = β.
We know that
ρi1(x
∗) = ρi2(x
∗) =
α + β
2
≤ max(α, β),
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with a strict inequality if α 6= β. If this were the case, then there would be a profitable
deviation since for some ε > 0 both i1 and i2 could win α − ε by playing y − ε and
β−ε by playing y+ε. Denote ξ := α = β and consider y′ 6= y such that x∗i3 = x
∗
i4
= y′
and card{i : xi = y
′} = 2. Then
ρi3(x
∗) = ρi4(x
∗) =
←
p i3(x
∗) +
→
p i4(x
∗)
2
=: ξ′.
If ξ < ξ′ player 1 (or 2) can deviate to y′ + ε and win ξ′ + ε. If ξ > ξ′ player 3 (or 4)
can deviate to y + ε and win ξ + ε. Therefore we must have ξ = ξ′.
(c) If (A.9) does not hold, then player i has an incentive to deviate anywhere in the
arc between x∗ij and x
∗
ij+1
.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. If a profile x∗ satisfies conditions (a), (b), (c) of Lemma A.23,
then no deviation to an interval between two players can be profitable. Suppose, ad
absurdum, that player i has an incentive to deviate in a location y occupied by player
j (and by nobody else, since we proved that, in equilibrium, we never have more than
two players in the same location). This implies that the payoffs of players i and j
before the deviation satisfy ρj(x
∗) > 2ρi(x
∗), that is,
ρj(x
∗) =
←
p j(x
∗) +
→
p j(x)
=
d(x∗j−1, x
∗
j) + d(x
∗
j , x
∗
j+1)
2
> 2ρi(x
∗),
which implies either d(x∗j−1, x
∗
j) > 2ρi(x
∗) or d(x∗j , x
∗
j+1) > 2ρi(x
∗). But this contra-
dicts (A.9). So x∗ is an equilibrium. Lemma A.25 below shows that for every n ∈ N
there exist strategy profiles that satisfy conditions (a), (b), (c) of Lemma A.23. Given
that, for each player, the set of equilibria is determined by a finite number of linear
inequalities, we have that this set is a polytope.
Lemma A.24. For every x ∈ C we have
σ(x) =
n∑
i=1
(xi+1 − xi)
2
4
=
∑n
i=1[(
←
p i(x))
2 + (
→
p i(x))
2]
2
,
where xn+1 := x1.
Proof. This is immediate from the definition of σ,
→
p i(x) and
←
p i(x).
Lemma A.25. Consider the game H (Nn, C,ρ). Call x˜ the action profile such that
x˜i =
i
n
2π.
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For n even call ˜˜x the action profile such that
˜˜x2i−1 = ˜˜x2i =
2i
n
2π, i ∈ {1, . . . , n/2}.
For n odd call ˜˜x⊥ the action profile such that
˜˜x2i−1 = ˜˜x2i =
2i
n
2π, i ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊n/2⌋}
xn = 2π.
(a) The action profiles x˜, ˜˜x, and ˜˜x⊥ are equilibria in H (Nn, C,ρ).
(b) For all positive n
x˜ ∈ arg min
x∈E (H )
σ(x), (A.10)
x˜ ∈ arg min
x∈Cn
σ(x), (A.11)
and
OptH (Nn, C,ρ) = BEqH (Nn, C,ρ) = σ(x˜) =
π2
n
. (A.12)
(c) For n even
˜˜x ∈ arg max
x∈E (H )
σ(x) (A.13)
and
WEqH (Nn, C,ρ) = σ(˜˜x) =
2π2
n
. (A.14)
(d) For n odd
˜˜x⊥ ∈ arg max
x∈E (H )
σ(x) (A.15)
and
WEqH (Nn, C,ρ) = σ(˜˜x
⊥) =
2π2
n+ 1
. (A.16)
Proof. (a) These profiles satisfy the conditions of Lemma A.23.
(b) Define
p(x) :=
(
←
p 1(x),
→
p 1(x), . . . ,
←
pn(x),
→
pn(x)
)
∈ R2n. (A.17)
Since, for all i ∈ Nn,
←
p i(x˜) =
→
p i(x˜) =
2π
2n
,
we have
p(x˜) =
(π
n
, . . . ,
π
n
)
∈ R2n.
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Then for all x ∈ Cn we have p(x˜) ≺ p(x). Hence, using Lemma A.27 and Schur-
convexity of the function
p(x) 7→
∑n
i=1[(
←
p i(x))
2 + (
→
p i(x))
2]
2
,
for every x ∈ Cn we have
σ(x˜) ≤ σ(x),
which proves (A.11).
Expression (A.10) follows from the fact that x˜ is an equilibrium.
To prove (A.12) consider that the cost generated by a half domain pi(x¯) is∫ π/n
0
x dλ(x) = π2/2n2 and there are 2n such half domains (See Figure 2).
(c) For i even
→
p i(˜˜x) =
2π
n
,
←
p i(˜˜x) = 0.
Lemma A.23(c) implies
→
p i(x) +
←
p i(x) ≤
2π
n
for all x ∈ E (H ).
Therefore,
p(x) ≺ p(˜˜x) for all x ∈ E (H ).
Again Lemma A.24 and the usual Schur-convexity argument provide (A.13).
To prove (A.14) consider that the cost generated by n of the half domains pi(xˆ)
is
∫ 2π/n
0
x dλ(x) = 2π2/n2 and the cost generated by the remaining n half domains is
0 (See Figure 3).
(d) To prove the A.16 consider that the cost generated by n+ 1 of the half domains
pi(xˆ) is
∫ 2π/(n+1)
0
x dλ(x) = 2π2/(n+ 1)2 and the cost generated by the remaining n
half domains is 0 (See Figure 4).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. (a) This follows from Lemma A.25(b), (c), and (d).
(b) This is just Lemma A.25(b).
Proofs of Subsection 4.2
Given a strategy profile x, for each player i ∈ Nn, we define two domains
←
p i(x)
and
→
p i(x) as follows. Order the players i1 ≺ · · · ≺ in in terms of their actions
0 ≤ xi1 ,≤ · · · ≤ xin ≤ 1 (solve the ties arbitrarily). For ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}
←
p iℓ(x) =
1
2
d(xiℓ−1 , xiℓ),
→
p iℓ(x) =
1
2
d(xiℓ , xiℓ+1),
←
p i1(x) = d(0, xi1),
→
p in(x) = d(xin , 1).
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The following lemma will be the building block of most of all our results in the
sequel.
Lemma A.26. Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium of H (Nn, [0, 1],ρ). Then
(a) For i ∈ Nn
ρi(x) =
1
card{ℓ : xℓ = xi}
∑
ℓ:xℓ=xi
(
←
p ℓ(x) +
→
p ℓ(x)
)
.
(b) For every y ∈ [0, 1]
card{i : x∗i = y} ≤ 2.
(c) There exist ξ > 0 such that for all y ∈ [0, 1], if
card{i : x∗i = y} = 2,
then
←
p i(x
∗) = 0 and
→
p i(x
∗) = ξ
or
→
p i(x
∗) = 0 and
←
p i(x
∗) = ξ.
(d) Players on the extremes are coupled, i.e., xi1 = xi2 and xin−1 = xin.
Proof. (a) Follow immediatly from the definition of payoffs.
(b) Suppose, ad absurdum, that there exist an equilibrium x∗ and a value y ∈ [0, 1]
such that {i : x∗i = y} = {i1, . . . , iℓ} with ℓ > 2. Then for some α, β > 0
←
p i1(x
∗) = α,
→
p i1(x
∗) = 0
for all j ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ− 1},
←
p ij(x
∗) =
→
p ij(x
∗) = 0,
←
p iℓ(x
∗) = 0,
→
p iℓ(x
∗) = β.
This implies
ℓ∑
i=1
ρi(x
∗) = α + β,
therefore
ρj(x
∗) =
α + β
ℓ
<
α + β
2
< max(α, β) for all j ∈ {1, ℓ}.
For ε small enough any player j ∈ {i1, ...iℓ} would get α− ε by playing y− ε or β− ε
by playing y + ε, so this would be a profitable deviation.
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(c) Let y ∈ [0, 1] be such that x∗i1 = x
∗
i2
= y and card{i : xi = y} = 2. Then for some
α, β > 0
→
p i1(x
∗) =
←
p i2(x
∗) = 0
←
p i1(x
∗) = α
→
p i2(x
∗) = β.
We know that
ρi1(x
∗) = ρi2(x
∗) =
α + β
2
≤ max(α, β),
with a strict inequality if α 6= β. If this were the case, then there would be a profitable
deviation since for some ε > 0 both i1 and i2 could win α − ε by playing y − ε and
β−ε by playing y+ε. Denote ξ := α = β and consider y′ 6= y such that x∗i3 = x
∗
i4
= y′
and card{i : xi = y
′} = 2. Then
ρi3(x
∗) = ρi4(x
∗) =
←
p i3(x
∗) +
→
p i4(x
∗)
2
=: ξ′.
If ξ < ξ′ player 1 (or 2) can deviate to y′ + ε and win ξ′ + ε. If ξ > ξ′ player 3 (or 4)
can deviate to y + ε and win ξ + ε. Therefore we must have ξ = ξ′.
(d) Suppose that xi1 < xi2 . Since
ρi1 =
←
p i1(x
∗) +
→
p i1(x
∗) = d(0, x∗i1) +
1
2
d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i2
),
player i1 would have a profitable deviation by playing (x
∗
i1
+ x∗i2)/2. The same argu-
ment holds for in−1 and in.
For the sake of completeness we give a full proof of Proposition 4.3, even if some
of the cases are known (see, e.g., Huck, Mu¨ller, and Vriend, 2002, Brenner, 2005,
Pa´lvo¨lgyi, 2011).
Proof of Proposition 4.3. (a) Consider the case n = 2. The strategy profile (1
2
, 1
2
) is
a Nash equilibrium. The payoff for each player is 1/2, whereas any deviation would
provide a lower payoff. It is unique, since for any profile (x1, x2) 6= (1/2, 1/2) both
players would rather deviate to (x1 + x2)/2 if x1 and x2 are on different sides of
(1/2, 1/2), or to 1/2 if they are on the same side (see Figure 5).
Consider now the case n = 4. We show that the profile (1/4, 1/4, 3/4, 3/4) is
the unique Nash equilibrium. In fact, by Lemma A.26(d), for some permutation
i1, i2, i3, i4, we must have xi1 = xi2 and xi3 = xi4 . Moreover, by Lemma A.26(c), we
have
x∗i1 = ξ = 1− x
∗
i4
, and x∗i4 − x
∗
i1
= 2ξ.
Hence ξ = 1/4 (see Figure 6).
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Finally, consider the case n = 5. We show that the profile (1/6, 1/6, 1/2, 5/6, 5/6)
is the unique Nash equilibrium. By Lemma A.26(d), for some permutation i1, i2, i3, i4, i5,
we have x∗i1 = x
∗
i2
and x∗i4 = x
∗
i5
. Moreover, by Lemma A.26(c), we have
x∗i1 = ξ = 1− x
∗
i5
, and x∗i4 − x
∗
i3
= x∗i3 − x
∗
i2
= 2ξ.
Hence ξ = 1/6 (see Figure 7).
(b) By Lemma A.26(b) in equilibrium we cannot have x∗1 = x
∗
2 = x
∗
3. For any
configuration different from this, one of the players whose action is not the middle
one, if she is alone in taking that action, will want to deviate closer to her opponents.
(c) We start with necessary conditions for x∗ to be a pure Nash equilibrium. By
Lemma A.26(c) and (d)
(i) x∗i1 = x
∗
i2
= 1− x∗in−1 = 1− x
∗
in = ξ,
(ii) x∗i3 − x
∗
i2
= x∗in−1 − x
∗
in−2
= 2ξ,
(iii) x∗ij+1 − x
∗
ij
≤ 2ξ for all j ∈ {4, . . . , n − 4}; if this were not the case, players
i1, i2, in−1, in, who earn ξ, would have an incentive to deviate anywhere in the
open interval ]x∗ij , x
∗
ij+1
[ and win (x∗ij+1 − x
∗
ij
)/2 > 2ξ.
(iv) x∗ij+1 − x
∗
ij−1
≥ 2ξ for all j ∈ {4, . . . , n− 4}; in fact, if j ∈ {4, . . . , n− 4}, then
ρj(x
∗) =
←
p ij(x
∗) +
→
p ij(x
∗) =
x∗ij+1 − x
∗
ij
2
+
x∗ij − x
∗
ij−1
2
=
x∗ij+1 − x
∗
ij−1
2
.
If ρj(x
∗) < ξ then player j would deviate to x∗1 − ε and win ξ − ε.
It is easy to check that any location x which verifies (i)–(iv) is a pure Nash
equilibrium since it does not allow any profitable deviation (see Figure 8). Therefore
conditions (i)–(iv) characterize equilibria in H (Nn, [0, 1],ρ). Since they are linear
inequalities, the set of equilibria is a polytope.
Lemma A.27. For every x ∈ [0, 1]n we have
σ(x) =
x21
2
+
n−1∑
i=1
(xj+1 − xj)
2
4
+
1− x2n
2
=
∑n
i=1[(
←
p i(x))
2 + (
→
p i(x))
2]
2
Proof. This is immediate from the definition of σ,
→
p i(x) and
←
p i(x).
Lemma A.28. If for all i ∈ Nn
x¯i =
2i− 1
2n
,
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then
x¯ ∈ arg min
x∈[0,1]n
σ(x) (A.18)
and
OptH (Nn, S,ρ) = σ(x¯) =
1
4n
. (A.19)
Proof. For all i ∈ Nn we have
←
p i(x¯) =
→
p i(x¯) =
1
2n
.
Define
R
2n ∋ p(x) :=
(
←
p 1(x),
→
p 1(x), . . . ,
←
pn(x),
→
pn(x)
)
. (A.20)
Hence
p(x¯) :=
(
1
2n
, . . . ,
1
2n
)
.
Then for all x ∈ [0, 1]n we have p(x¯) ≺ p(x). Hence, using Lemma A.27 and Schur-
convexity of the function
p(x) 7→
∑n
i=1[(
←
p i(x))
2 + (
→
p i(x))
2]
2
,
for every x ∈ [0, 1]n we have
σ(x¯) ≤ σ(x),
which proves (A.18). To prove (A.19) consider that the average cost generated by a
half domain pi(x¯) is 1/8n
2 and there are 2n such half domains (See Figure 9).
Lemma A.29. Consider the game H (Nn, [0, 1],ρ) and the action profiles xˇ, xˆ, and
xˆℓ, defined as follows:
For every positive n
xˇ1 = xˇ2 =
1
n− 4
,
xˇi =
2i− 1
n− 4
, i ∈ {3, . . . , n− 2},
xˇn−1 = xˇn =
n− 5
n− 4
.
For n even
xˆ2i−1 = xˆ2i =
2i− 1
n
, i ∈ {1, . . . , n/2}.
For n odd and ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , ⌊n−2
2
⌋}
xˆℓ2i−1 = xˆ
ℓ
2i =
2i− 1
n+ 1
, i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},
xˆℓ2ℓ+1 =
2ℓ+ 1
n+ 1
,
xˆℓ2i = xˆ
ℓ
2i+1 =
2i+ 1
n+ 1
, i ∈
{
ℓ+ 1, . . . ,
⌊n
2
⌋}
.
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(a) The action profiles xˇ, xˆ, and xˆℓ are equilibria in H (Nn, [0, 1],ρ).
(b) For all n ≥ 4
xˇ = arg min
x∈E (H )
σ(x) (A.21)
and
BEqH (Nn, [0, 1],ρ) = σ(xˇ) =
1
4(n− 2)
. (A.22)
(c) For n even
xˆ = arg max
x∈E (H )
σ(x) (A.23)
and
WEqH (Nn, [0, 1],ρ) = σ(xˆ) =
1
2n
. (A.24)
(d) For n > 3 odd
xˆℓ = arg max
x∈E (H )
σ(x) (A.25)
and
WEqH (Nn, [0, 1],ρ) = σ(xˆ
ℓ) =
n
2(n+ 1)
. (A.26)
Proof. (a) It is easy to see that xˇ, xˆ, xˆℓ are either the unique equilibria of H (Nn, [0, 1],ρ)
as in Proposition 4.3(a)(b) or satisfy conditions (i)–(iv) of the proof of Proposi-
tion 4.3(c).
(b) By Lemma A.26(c) for every equilibrium x∗ of H (Nn, [0, 1],ρ) there exists ξ > 0
such that
←
p 1(x
∗) =
→
p 2(x
∗) =
←
p 3(x
∗) =
→
pn−2(x
∗) =
←
pn−1(x
∗) =
→
pn(x
∗) = ξ, (A.27a)
→
p 1(x
∗) =
←
p 2(x
∗) =
→
pn−1(x
∗) =
←
pn(x
∗) = 0, (A.27b)
→
p i(x
∗) ≤ ξ,
←
p i(x
∗) ≤ ξ,
→
p i(x
∗) +
←
p i(x
∗) ≥ ξ for all i ∈ Nn. (A.27c)
Moreover
←
p 1(xˇ) =
→
p 2(xˇ) =
←
p 3(xˇ) =
→
pn−2(xˇ) =
←
pn−1(xˇ) =
→
pn(xˇ) =
1
2n− 4
,
→
p 1(xˇ) =
←
p 2(xˇ) =
→
pn−1(xˇ) =
←
pn(xˇ) = 0
and for all i ∈ {4, . . . , n− 3}
→
p i(xˇ) =
←
p i(xˇ) =
→
p 3(xˇ) =
←
pn−2(xˇ) =
1
2n− 4
. (A.28)
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Define the simplex
S =
{
q = (q1, . . . , q2n) : qi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , 2n, and
2n∑
i=1
qi = 1
}
and consider the vectors q1, q2 ∈ S , where
q1 :=
(
1
2n− 4
, . . . ,
1
2n− 4
, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
, (A.29)
q2 := (ξ, ξ, ξ, ξ, ξ, ξ, y1, . . . , y2n−10, 0, 0, 0, 0), (A.30)
with ξ ≥ yi for i = 1, . . . , 2n− 10. Since q1, q2 ∈ S , we have
ξ ≥
1
2n− 4
.
It is not difficult to see that, using the notation of (A.17), the vector p(xˇ) is a
permutation of q1 and the vector p(x
∗) is a permutation of q2. Moreover q1 ≺ q2,
hence p(xˇ) ≺ p(x∗). Lemma A.27 and the usual Schur-convexity argument provide
therefore (A.21).
To prove (A.22) consider that the cost generated by 2n − 4 of the half domains
pi(xˇ) is
(2n− 4)
1
2(2n− 4)2
=
1
4n− 8
and the cost generated by the remaining 4 half domains is 0 (See Figure 10).
(c) For i odd
←
p i(xˆ) =
1
n
,
→
p i(xˆ) = 0
and for i even
→
p i(xˆ) =
1
n
,
←
p i(xˆ) = 0.
Consider the vector
q3 :=
(
1
n
, . . . ,
1
n
, 0, . . . , 0
)
∈ S . (A.31)
Conditions (A.27) imply ξ ≤ 1/n. Therefore q2 ≺ q3. Since q3 is a permutation of xˆ,
we have p(x∗) ≺ p(xˆ). Again Lemma A.27 and the usual Schur-convexity argument
provide (A.23).
To prove (A.24) consider that the total average cost generated by n of the half do-
mains pi(xˆ) is 1/2n
2 and the average cost generated by the remaining n half domains
is 0 (See Figure 11).
(d) The argument is similar to the one used to prove (c) (See Figure 12).
Proof of Proposition 4.4. (a) Just combine Lemma A.28 and Lemma A.29(c)(d).
(b) Combine Lemma A.28 and Lemma A.29(b).
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Proofs of Subsection 4.3
For j ∈ {1, . . . , k} define
N j =
{
i ∈ N : xi ∈ ev0vj \ {v0}
}
,
and call h(j) the cardinality of N j. Order the players ij,1 ≺ · · · ≺ ij,h(j) ∈ N
j in
terms of the distance of their actions xij,1 , . . . , xij,h(j) from v0, from the smallest to the
largest (solve the ties arbitrarily).
For j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, define
pj(x) =
{
d(v0, xij,1)/2 if there is at least one player on ev0vj ,
1 otherwise.
Call gij,ℓ the payoff of player ij,ℓ.
Lemma A.30. If the profile x is such that there is a player in v0, then
(a) the payoff of the player in v0 is ∑k
j=1 pj(x)
card{ℓ : xl = v0}
,
(b) for j in {1, . . . , k} we have
gij,1 =
d(v0, xij,1) + d(xij,1 , xij,2)
2 card{m : xm = xij,1}
,
gij,ℓ =
d(xij,ℓ−1 , xij,ℓ) + d(xij,ℓ , xij,ℓ+1)
2 card{m : xm = xij,ℓ}
for ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , h(j)− 1},
gij,h(j) =
2d(xij,h(j) , vj) + d(xij,h(j) , xij,h(j)−1)
2 card{m : xm = xij,h(j)}
Proof. Obvious from the definition
Lemma A.31. Let j¯ = argminj pj and assume that in the profile x there is no player
in v0. Then for j in {1, . . . , k} we have
gij,1 =

d(xij,1 , xij ,2) + d(xij,1 , xij¯,1)
2 card{m : xm = xij,1}
for j 6= j¯
2pj¯ +
∑
j 6=j¯(pj − pj¯) + d(xij¯,1 , xij¯,2)
2 card{m : xm = xij¯,1}
for j = j¯
with xij,2 = vj if xij,1 is the only location on the edge j.
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Proof. Obvious from the definition
Lemma A.32. Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium of the Hotelling game H (Nn, Sk,ρ).
Then the following hold:
(a) There exists i∗ ∈ {1, ..., N} such that x∗i∗ = v0.
(b) For every x ∈ S \ {v0}, card{i : x
∗
i = x} ≤ 2.
(c) card{i : x∗i = v0} ≤ k.
(d) If for some i ∈ Nn we have x
∗
i ∈ ev0vj , then for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k} there exist
at least two players ij,h(j), ij,h(j)−1 ∈ N
j such that x∗ij,h(j) = x
∗
ij,h(j)−1
.
Proof. (a) Consider a star Sk with k ≥ 3 and assume ad absurdum that no player is in
v0. Consider the player i such that x
∗
i is the closest position to v0. For ε < d(x
∗
i , v0),
if player i moves of ε towards the center, then she loses ε/2 on the edge where she is
and gains ε/2 on every other edge. Therefore moving towards the center is profitable.
(b) Since x∗ ∈ S \ {v0} and since there is a player in v0, we are in the situation
considered in Lemma A.26(b). Therefore, at most two players can be in the same
location.
(c) Suppose that card{i : x∗i = v0} = k
′ > k. Then the players in the center win
1
k′
k∑
j=0
pj(x
∗) < max
j∈{1,...,k}
pj(x
∗).
Then a player who moves by ε from v0 in the direction of the maximum pj(x
∗) enjoys
a profitable deviation.
(d) Suppose that there exists i ∈ Nn such that x
∗
i ∈ ev0vj . Then player i cannot
be alone on her edge: if she were, she would have a profitable deviation by moving
towards the center. If one edge were empty, then any of the players could profitably
deviate by moving to the empty edge, close enough to v0.
Lemma A.33. Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium of H (Nn, Sk,ρ) and let y ∈ ev0,vj \{v0},
be such that
card{ℓ : x∗ℓ = y} = 2,
and call iℓ and iℓ+1 the two players in y. We have
(a) if h(j) > ℓ+ 1, then
gij,ℓ = gij,ℓ+1 = d(x
∗
ij,ℓ
, x∗ij,ℓ−1) = d(x
∗
ij,ℓ+1
, x∗ij,ℓ+2) =: ξ(y).
(b) if h(j) = ℓ+ 1, then
gij,ℓ = gij,ℓ+1 = d(x
∗
ij,ℓ
, x∗ij,ℓ−1) =
1
2
d(x∗ij,ℓ+1 , vj) =: ξ(y).
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(c) The value ξ(y) does not depend on y (hence we simply denote it ξ).
Proof. For (a) and (b) the proof is similar to the one given for Lemma A.26 for the
interval.
(c) Suppose that ξ(y1) > ξ(y2), then players in y2 have a payoff strictly smaller than
players in y1. Then, for ε > 0 small enough, they can profitably deviate by moving ε
close to y1 and getting ξ(y1)− ε.
Lemma A.34. Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium of H (Nn, Sk,ρ). If card{ℓ : x
∗
ℓ = v0} =
degree(v0) = k, then
pj(x
∗) = ξ.
Proof. Suppose that card{ℓ : x∗ℓ = v0} = k, then the payoff of the players in v0 is
k−1
∑k
j=1 pj(x).
First we prove that all the pj are equal, for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Indeed suppose, ad
absurdum, that
max
j
pj(x
∗) >
∑k
j=1 pj(x)
k
.
If jˆ ∈ argmaxj pj(x), then any player in the center would improve her payoff by
moving towards vjˆ by ε small enough.
Now we have to prove that ∑k
j=1 pj(x)
k
= ξ. (A.32)
Suppose, ad absurdum, that ξ > k−1
∑k
j=1 pj(x) and that y satisfies the conditions
of Lemma A.33. Then any player in the center could profitably deviate by moving
very close to y and increase her payoff up to ξ − ε, for any ε > 0. Suppose now that
ξ < k−1
∑k
j=1 pj(x). Then one of the two players in y can move very close to v0 on
any edge and increase his payoff up to k−1
∑k
j=1 pj(x) − ε for any ε > 0. Therefore
in equilibrium (A.32) holds.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. (a) First we prove that the profile x∗ such that x∗i = v0 for
all i ∈ Nn is indeed an equilibrium. If any player i deviates, he will obtain a payoff
that is strictly less than 1, whereas by not deviating she obtains k/n ≥ 1.
Now we turn to prove uniqueness. Assume by contradiction that there exists an
equilibrium such that for some i ∈ Nn we have xi ∈ ev0vj . Then, by Lemma A.32(d),
each edge ev0vj has been chosen by at least two players. This implies that n ≥ 2k,
which is impossible, since n ≤ k.
(b) Assume by contradiction that an equilibrium x∗ exists. If x∗i = v0 for all i ∈ Nn,
then each player gains k/n ≤ 1, so a profitable deviation is possible.
We consider now the case where for some i ∈ Nn we have xi 6= v0.
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First we consider the case k < n < 2k. If for some i ∈ Nn we have x
∗
i 6= v0, then,
by Lemma A.32(d), 2k players choose an action different from v0, which is impossible
since n < 2k.
If n = 2k, and for some i ∈ Nn we have x
∗
i 6= v0, then, by Lemma A.32(d), x
∗
i 6= v0
for all i ∈ Nn and, by Lemma A.33, d(x
∗
i , v0) = 1/2. This cannot be an equilibrium,
since any player i has an incentive to deviate choosing x∗i = v0.
Assume now 2k < n < 3k − 1. The profile where all the players choose v0 is
not an equilibrium. By Lemma A.32(d), for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, there exist at least
two players ij,h(j)−1, ij,h(j) ∈ N
j such that d(x∗ij,h(j)−1 , vj) = d(x
∗
ij,h(j)
, vj) = ξ. The
equilibrium action of the remaining n − 2k players must be v0. If this were not the
case, then, for some j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, there would be three players on the edge j and
1 ≤ d(v0, x
∗
j,1) + d(x
∗
j,1, x
∗
j,h(j)) + d(x
∗
j,h(j), vj) = d(v0, x
∗
j,1) + 3ξ.
On the other hand, there are at most k − 2 remaining players, so there is an other
edge with only two players. This implies 1 = 3ξ, which is a contradiction. Therefore
the remaining k− 2 players left must be in v0. The payoff of every player i such that
x∗i = v0 equals k/3(n− 2k). The payoff of every other player is 1/3 and therefore any
of them would have an incentive to deviate to v0, gaining k/3(n − 2k + 1) which is
larger than 1/3 when n < 3k − 1.
(c) It is easy to prove that a profile x∗ where on each edge two players sit at a
distance 2/3 from the origin and the remaining players sit at v0 is an equilibrium. We
now show uniqueness. Indeed we know from Lemma A.32(c) that a profile where all
players choose v0 is not an equilibrium; moreover Lemma A.32(d) implies that each
edge has at least two players. Using the same argument that we used in the proof of
(b), we can show that no edge can have three players if another edge has only two.
By Lemma A.32(a), at least one player chooses v0, therefore it is not possible to have
three players on each edge, if n ∈ {3k− 1, 3k}. Hence all remaining players are in v0.
(d) We now assume n ≥ 3k+1. Let n = mk+ r be the Euclidean division of n by k.
We will construct an equilibrium x∗ with m players on each edge and r players in the
center, like in Figure 15. Let (2m− 3)ξ+ y = 1. This profile is indeed an equilibrium
if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) None of the r players in v0 has an incentive to deviate to an interval of length
2ξ, that is, for all i ∈ Nn such that x
∗
i = v0, we have ρi(x
∗) = ky/2r ≥ ξ, which
implies y ≥ 2rξ/k.
(ii) No player has an incentive to deviate to v0. Given that ρi(x
∗) ≥ ξ for all i ∈ Nn
such that x∗i 6= v0, we have ky/2(r + 1) ≤ ξ, which implies y ≤ 2(r + 1)ξ/k.
(iii) No player has an incentive to deviate to an interval of length y, that is y ≤ 2ξ.
(iv) No player has an incentive to deviate to a location with another single player.
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If she did, her payoff would be either ξ or
ξ
2
+
y
4
≤ ξ.
Then, for any ξ such that
k
2(r + 1) + 2km− 3k
≤ ξ ≤
k
2r + 2km− 3k
the profile x∗ is an equilibrium. Hence we have an infinite number of Nash pure
equilibria.
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B Figures
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e4 e5
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2 players in u
5 players in vu v
Figure 1: Domains of attraction when λ(e4) = λ(e5).
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1 player
Figure 2: Best equilibrium x˜ on C with 6 players.
2 players
Figure 3: Worst equilibrium ˜˜x on C with 6 players.
1 player
2 players
Figure 4: Worst equilibrium ˜˜x⊥ on C with 5 players.
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2 players
0 1
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Figure 5: Unique equilibrium with 2 players.
2 players
0 1
1
4
1
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Figure 6: Unique equilibrium with 4 players.
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2 players0 1
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Figure 7: Unique equilibrium with 5 players.
1 player
2 players0 1
ξ 2ξ η1 η2 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ηn−6 ηn−5 2ξ ξ
Figure 8: Example of equilibrium with n players.
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Figure 9: Social optimum x¯ with n players.
1 player
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Figure 10: Best equilibrium xˇ with n players.
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n
2
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Figure 11: Worst equilibrium xˆ with n players (n even).
1 player
2 players0 1
1
n+1
2
n+1 · · · · · ·
2
n+1
1
n+1
Figure 12: Worst equilibrium xˆℓ with n players (n odd, ℓ = 2).
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2 players
k − 1 players
2ξ
2ξ2ξ
2ξ
2ξ 2ξ
ξ
ξξ
ξ
ξ ξ
Figure 13: Equilibrium on Sk with 3k − 1 players, k = 6.
1 player
2 players
k − 1 players
ξ
ξξ
ξ
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2ξ
2ξ2ξ
2ξ
2ξ 2ξ
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2ξ2ξ
2ξ
2ξ 2ξ
Figure 14: Equilibrium on Sk with 4k − 1 players, k = 6.
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1 player
2 players
r players
ξ
ξξ
ξ
ξ ξ
2ξ
2ξ2ξ
2ξ
2ξ 2ξ
2ξ
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2ξ
2ξ 2ξ
y
yy
y
y y
Figure 15: Equilibrium on Sk with 4k+ r players, k = 6 (2rξ/k ≤ y ≤ 2(r+1)ξ/k).
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1 player
2 players
degree(v) playersv w
2ξ 2ξ α(e)ξ . . . α(e)ξ 2ξ ξ
Figure 16: Players in e ∈ EL.
1 player
2 players
degree(v) players
degree(w) playersv w
2ξ α(e)ξ · · · α(e)ξ α(e)ξ 2ξ 2ξ
Figure 17: Players in e ∈ EI .
1 player
2 playersv w
ξ 2ξ α(e)ξ · · · α(e)ξ 2ξ 2ξ ξ
Figure 18: Players in e ∈ ELL.
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